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ABSTRACT:  The EU has recently launched the European Neighbourhood Policy, aimed at 
fostering integration with countries located close to its borders. This article proposes a liberal 
intergovernmentalist framework for the analysis of Ukraine's prospects of integration with the 
EU and apply it to evaluate the main economic and political benefits and costs associated to 
three possible scenarios: free trade area, fully developed European Neighbourhood Policy and 
EU accession. Two main conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, gains from integration would be 
asymmetrically distributed and would mostly accrue to Ukraine, whilst the main obstacles to 
integration would not be economic, but political. Secondly, the European Neighbourhood 
Policy does not represent a credible long-term alternative to EU membership for Ukraine; 
thus the outcome of the integration process should probably consist either in the mere creation 
of a free trade area or in EU accession.  
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The events related to the 2004 Ukraine's presidential election (the so-called "Orange 
Revolution") brought this country, and especially its prospects of becoming a fully-fledged 
democracy, to the international community's attention. In such a context, the issue of 
integration with the European Union (EU) is becoming more and more relevant. So far, the 
relations between the EU and Ukraine have been regulated by a Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, entered into force in 1998. It provides for cooperation in a wide range of areas, 
including p olitical dialogue, trade, investment, economic and legislative cooperation, and 
cultural and scientific cooperation. 
Following the 2004 Eastern enlargement, the EU has recently launched the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which offers ‘the prospect of a stake in the EU Internal 
Market’ (European Commission 2004: 13) to all countries located near the borders of the EU 
which have not been granted the prospect of future membership.1 In the long term, the final 
goal of the ENP might be that of reaching with these countries a level of integration similar to 
the present European Economic Area (EEA). 
Applying the ENP to Ukraine raises some interesting political economy issues. What are the 
main interests at stake, on both the EU and the Ukrainian sides, and the main challenges in 
this integration process? Can the ENP be a credible alternative to full EU membership? This 
paper seeks to answer these questions by using a liberal intergovernmentalist approach 
(Moravcsik 1993, 1998), emphasising, first of all, domestic economic interests and, secondly, 
geopolitical motives as the main determinants of countries' preferences in international 
negotiations. More specifically, we discuss potential benefits and costs for both EU member 
states and Ukraine associated to three different scenarios, characterised by an increasing 
degree of integration: free trade area (FTA), fully developed ENP and EU membership.  
Two main conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, potential  benefits from 
integration would be asymmetrically distributed, being more significant for Ukraine than for 
the EU; moreover, the main obstacles to integration would not be economic, but political. 
Second, the ENP lacks attractiveness in the long term because it would impose obligations 
analogous to those of EU membership on Ukraine, but without the corresponding benefits; 
thus the integration process is likely either to produce a more modest outcome, limited to the 
creation of an FTA, or to lead to EU accession. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the main features of the ENP   3 
with reference to Ukraine. Section 3 presents a liberal intergovernmentalist framework for the 
analysis of EU-Ukraine integration. Section 4 applies such theoretical framework to the three 
different scenarios of integration mentioned above. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  The nature of EU-Ukraine relations in the light of the ENP 
 
The relations between the EU and Ukraine have been regulated so far through the contractual 
framework provided by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which was concluded in 
1994 and entered into force in March 1998. The most relevant provisions concern the 
economic sphere. The parties accord to one another Most Favoured Nation treatment and limit 
the possibility of imposing restrictions on imports and exports, while specific articles govern 
conditions for establishment and operation of companies, approximation of legislation, 
intellectual property rights and trade defence instruments.  
Even if EU imports of manufactured goods from Ukraine are to a large extent liberalised, 
special agreements still govern trade in some sensitive products, namely steel and textiles. 
Trade in certain steel products is currently regulated by a quota system to be replaced by a 
new agreement, the negotiations of which were completed on 31 March 2005. Reciprocal 
liberalisation of trade in textile products started from 1 January 2001. A new bilateral 
agreement, abolishing import and export licensing requirements for all textiles, was signed on 
9 March 2005 (European Commission 2005d). With regard to agricultural trade, Ukraine does 
not benefit from any EU preferential scheme and in some instances still faces relatively high 
tariff barriers.  
Following the 2004  Eastern enlargement, the EU has recently started developing the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), intended for those countries that are located near its 
borders, but do not currently have the prospect of membership. Through it, the EU is going to 
offer a more intensive political dialogue and greater access to its programmes and policies 
(European Commission 2004).  
In more detail, in the political field the ENP should lead to intensified relations, including 
cross border co-operation and shared r esponsibility in conflict prevention and conflict 
resolution. The most significant elements of the ENP, however, focus on the economic field. 
They include: 
a) enhanced trade integration; in the case of Ukraine, that imply the possible establishment of 
an FTA;   4 
b) the prospect of participating in the EU Internal Market and in selected EU programmes in 
the areas of research and education; 
c) increased financial and technical assistance;  
d) improved interconnection with the EU in sectors like energy, telecommunication and 
transport. 
To implement the ENP, the method proposed by the European Commission is to define, 
together with partner countries, a set of priorities, whose fulfilment would bring them closer 
to the EU. These priorities are to be incorporated in jointly agreed Action Plans, defining a 
number of key areas for specific short- and medium-term action. After the presentation of a 
Strategy Paper by the European Commission in May 2004, the Action Plan for Ukraine, 
covering a three-year period, was jointly adopted at a special EU-Ukraine Co-operation 
Council on 21 February 2005. Moreover, on the same day, the EU General Affairs and 
External Relations Council agreed ten specific measures for closer co-operation in order to 
foster the process of democratisation and  economic reform following the 2004 O range 
Revolution. They cover, inter alia, issues such as foreign and security policy, visa facilitation, 
Ukraine's accession to the World Trade Organization (a key condition to be satisfied before 
possible negotiations for an FTA may start) and financial assistance (European Commission 
2005c). 
The 2004 ENP Strategy Paper envisages that, when Action Plan priorities are met, the 
following step could consist in the negotiation with each partner country of a bilateral 
European Neighbourhood Agreement, which, in Ukraine's case, would replace the present 
Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. Progress made in the implementation of the Action 
Plans should therefore enable the EU and its partners to agree on longer term goals for further 
development of relations in the years ahead. 
The long-term implications of the ENP are therefore still characterised by quite a large degree 
of vagueness and uncertainty. It is worth noting that the early 2003 Commission proposals 
explicitly suggested that the ENP would promote the "four freedoms" (concerning movement 
of persons, goods, services and capital) on which the Single Market is based, in return for 
approximation of partner countries' legislation with that of the EU (European Commission 
2003).  The final outcome would be a degree of economic integration comparable to the 
present EEA. By contrast, the 2004 Strategy Paper makes no direct reference to that and only 
focuses on the medium-term Action Plans instead (Moshes and Haukkala 2004). Because of 
this shift of emphasis, Vahl (2005) argues that 'it is clear that the extent of economic 
integration through the ENP has been scaled down and will fall far short of the EEA' (p. 9).    5 
Whilst this appears true if the perspective is restricted to the time span covered by the Action 
Plans, however the chance of negotiating new European Neighbourhood Agreements may still 
open the door to deeper integration in the long run, including a progressive establishment of 
the "four freedoms". In other words, the ENP looks like an open-ended process. Its ambiguity 
will dissipate only when the EU makes clear what 'the prospect of a stake in the EU Internal 
Market' ultimately means. 
 
 
3. Liberal intergovernmentalism and EU-Ukraine relations: a conceptual framework  
 
In this section we provide a theoretical framework enabling us to analyse the prospects of 
Ukraine's economic and political integration with the EU. To do so, we draw on liberal 
intergovernmentalism, a theory developed by Andrew Moravcsik (1993, 1998), which seeks 
to explain the major turning points in European i ntegration history. Very concisely, it 
proposes a three-level analysis of the European integration process focusing on the formation 
of national preferences, the outcome of intergovernmental bargaining and the subsequent 
choice of international institutions. 
A liberal intergovernmentalist approach is also suitable for the analysis of EU agreements 
with third countries, because both association agreements (according to Art. 300 and Art. 310 
of the EC Treaty) and accession to the EU (under Art. 49 of the EU Treaty) require unanimity 
among member states and therefore may fit into the category of interstate bargaining. With 
regard to the former, theoretical frameworks drawing on liberal intergovernmentalism have 
been recently used to analyse, for instance, the 2000 Cotonou Agreement with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries (Forwood 2001) and the Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements with the Southern Mediterranean countries (Montanari 2005). As regards the 
latter, Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003) and, partially, Schimmelfennig (2001) employ 
liberal intergovernmentalism to account for the EU Eastern enlargement process. 
The first two levels of liberal intergovernmental analysis are those relevant for our model of 
EU-Ukraine relations: how domestic groups' interests translate into state preferences and how 
the outcome of international negotiations is shaped according to the relative bargaining power 
of the players involved. Negotiations leading to international agreements take place therefore 
at two levels: within countries, involving domestic groups with different interests, and among 
states. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by lobbying the 
government to adopt a position favourable to them, then, at the international level, the aim of   6 
national governments is to maximize their ability to defend domestic interests. Since most EU 
activities belong to the economic sphere, domestic interests are principally economic, but also 
geopolitical concerns may play a significant role. Before proceeding further, we have to 
define better what we mean by 'international level' when the EU negotiates with a third 
country. It includes two distinct phases, taking place sequentially: first, bargaining among EU 
member states in order to find a common position vis-à-vis the partner country, then, 
negotiations with that country to conclude a bilateral agreement.    
However, governments are not always so strictly constrained by domestic actors. There are at 
least two kinds of situations where they can find more room for manoeuvre. The first is when 
the future effects of a specific policy are uncertain. 'Uncertainty about the effects of co-
operation arises where policies are stated vaguely, left to future negotiation, mediated by 
complex market processes, or applied in an unpredictable way across a population. Uncertain 
policies engender less opposition than those that  are immediate, precise and targeted' 
(Moravcsik 1993: 490). The second arises when an issue is perceived as not very salient from 
a political economy viewpoint. ' When net expected costs are insignificant, ambiguous, 
balanced or uncertain, governments enjoy a greater autonomy from particularistic domestic 
groups that oppose co-operation' (Moravcsik 1993: 490). 
When moving from the domestic to the international level, the theory has to explain how 
intergovernmental bargaining are shaped. Here the fundamental concept is "asymmetrical 
interdependence", firstly introduced by Keohane and Nye (1977): the states which are going 
to gain the most from international co-operation are more willing to compromise. Therefore, 
countries expecting to get large benefits have the most intense preferences for agreement and 
are disposed to make concessions in order to reach it, because it would still make them better-
off than the status quo. By contrast, countries for which agreement is less important are more 
likely to see their priorities get through, because they can credibly threaten not to ratify any 
agreement far from their preferences.  
Nevertheless, countries with intense preferences for agreement can sometimes influence the 
outcome of the negotiations in a subtle way. In his analysis of the EU Eastern enlargement 
process, Schimmelfennig (2001) proposes the concept of 'rhetorical action', a set of strategies, 
played by both the candidate countries and some EU members, consisting in the manipulation 
of European identity and the accession criteria or in complaints about alleged inequality of 
treatment between candidate countries. Such concept would provide a better explanation than 
"standard" liberal intergovernmentalism for the EU's decision to move from association 
agreements to the offer of membership to the Central and Eastern European countries   7 
(CEECs).  
Since it involves EU norms and values, rhetorical action may seem to imply a radical 
deviation from liberal intergovernmentalist a ssumptions towards a social constructivist 
perspective. However, as pointed out by Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003), rhetorical action 
was effective during the enlargement process because economic and geopolitical benefits 
were present, economic costs were modest (or, at least, sunk) and the overall impact of 
enlargement on the EU was very limited. Moreover, references to norms and values were used 
strategically in a rationalist framework. Hence rhetorical action can be better viewed as an 
extension of liberal intergovernmentalism for the analysis of EU negotiations with third 
countries than as a departure from it (see Schimmelfennig 2004 for an exhaustive discussion 
on this point). 
There is also another feature of international bargaining which applies specifically to the EU 
when it negotiates bilateral agreements (Bofinger 1995, Sedelmeier and Wallace 2000). In 
such a situation, the EU has a strong bargaining power because, before negotiating with a 
third partner, it needs to find a position acceptable to all its members; subsequently, any 
change in that position during the negotiations has to win support from each of them again. It 
is thus difficult that a radical shift in the EU’s stance may take place during the negotiations, 
since it would be very probably resisted by some member states (Forwood 2001, Montanari 
2005).2 
Finally, one has to evaluate the likely effects of a specific agreement. In the case of EU-
Ukraine relations, as well as in the other processes involving EU neighbouring countries, the 
basic political economy question is whether the degree of integration chosen provides enough 
incentive to trigger economic and political reform in the partner countries. In this context, a 
bilateral agreement can be defined as efficient if, in the medium to long term, it may represent 
an effective external anchor for Ukraine's government to credibly commit itself to reformist 
policies, aimed at establishing a functioning market economy and a fully-fledged democracy, 
and to overcome internal opposition to them. This concept will guide us in comparing and 
assessing the different scenarios of integration. 
The liberal intergovernmentalist framework built in this section can be summarised in a few 
propositions which will constitute the starting point of our analysis in the remaining part of 
the paper: 
•  the process leading to an international agreement can be modelled as a two-level 
game: first, domestic interest groups compete to shape national preferences, then 
national governments engage in international bargaining where they try to satisfy   8 
domestic pressures; 
•  at the domestic level, national preferences are shaped by economic and geopolitical 
interests. However, governments enjoy more freedom when the future effects of a 
specific policy are uncertain or when an issue is not politically or economically 
sensitive; 
•  at the international level, (encompassing, in the case of the EU, two dimensions: 
bargaining among member states and negotiations with Ukraine) the relative 
bargaining power of governments depends on the importance attributed to agreement: 
the actors expecting to benefit the most from co-operation are more willing to make 
concessions (asymmetrical interdependence), but may strategically use EU norms and 
values to influence the final outcome of the negotiations (rhetorical action). Moreover, 
the requirement of unanimity among member states strengthens the EU's bargaining 
power; 
•  a EU-Ukraine bilateral agreement is efficient if it may effectively spur the Ukrainian 
government to pursue political and economic reform in the medium to long term. 
 
 
4. Three possible scenarios of integration 
 
In this section we outline and compare three different scenarios for the evolution of EU-
Ukraine relations: FTA, fully developed ENP and EU membership. Our aim is not to predict 
what will happen in the next few years or in the long run, but rather to evaluate the potential  
political and economic benefits and costs of each scenario, analysing the main interests at 




This may be defined as a minimalist scenario, because it implies a much lower degree of 
integration than the other two. An FTA would entail a complete liberalisation of trade in both 
manufactured and agricultural goods, which would require the abolition of special provisions 
for sensitive industrial sectors (steel and textiles) and of the protectionist regime governing 
agricultural products. To understand the issues at stake, we need to examine the present EU-
Ukraine trade relations in detail. Over the last decade, EU-15 trade with Ukraine grew quite 
steadily from roughly €2 billion for both imports and exports to €7 billion for exports and   9 
€4.5 billion for imports; figures are about 50 per cent higher for the EU-25. In both cases, the 
EU trade surplus has been widening significantly (Figure 1). 
<insert Figure 1 here> 
Absolute values, however, do not reveal much about the relevance of Ukraine as a trading 
partner of the EU, which can be better assessed by examining the evolution of the share of 
total EU external trade made with that country. Figure 2 shows that it has only increased 
modestly since the mid-1990s; at present, barely 0.4 per cent of EU-15 imports and 0.7 per 
cent of its exports come from or go to Ukraine. In this case too, figures for the EU-25 are 
roughly 50 per cent higher.  
<insert Figure 2 here> 
While one can thus conclude that Ukraine accounts for an extremely small share of EU 
external trade, Figure 3 shows that, by contrast, the EU has become a very relevant trading 
partner for Ukraine. In the mid-1990s, less than 15 per cent of both Ukraine's imports and 
exports originated from or went to the EU, whereas, after the 2004 enlargement, these shares 
have reached 30 per cent. The EU has now become the most important market for Ukraine's 
exports, surpassing the Community of Independent States (CIS), whose share has steadily 
declined in the last few years and which is still Ukraine's main supplier (providing about 50 
per cent of its imports), chiefly because of energy supplies from Russia. 
<insert Figure 3 here> 
This is a clear example of asymmetrical interdependence: Ukraine may obtain much larger 
benefits than the EU from the establishment of an FTA. After analysing aggregated flows, it 
is necessary to disaggregate trade, first by sectors then by countries, with a view to identifying 
possible more specific interests at stake. 
EU exports to Ukraine are concentrated in more capital intensive and technologically 
advanced products (especially machinery), where the EU enjoys large surpluses (Table 1). 
Also in sensitive products, such as textiles and clothing, the EU trade balance is positive. The 
main imports, on the contrary, are represented by energy, a sector registering quite a large 
deficit, and agricultural products, where, however, the EU deficit is much smaller. 
<insert Table 1 here> 
Some interesting conclusions can be reached by further disaggregating trade flows and 
examining the pattern of Ukraine's comparative advantage in trade with the EU. To do so, we 
use an index of revealed comparative advantage, first proposed by Balassa (1965). Our 
measure is similar to that employed by Brenton et al. (2001), because we only focus on 
exports to the EU, and is defined as:   10 
 
RCA=(XUKR,k/XUKR)/(XW,k/XW)                                                                                                (1) 
 
where 
XUKR,k is the value of Ukraine’s exports of sector k to the EU; 
XUKR  is the value of Ukraine’s total exports to the EU; 
XW,K is the value of world exports (including EU member countries) of sector k to the EU; 
XW is the value of total world exports (including EU member countries) to the EU.  
This index is thus calculated as the ratio between the share of a particular sector in Ukraine’s 
exports to the EU and the share of this sector in world exports to the EU. Values above 1 
reveal that Ukraine has a comparative advantage in the production (or a specialisation in the 
export) of a given product. The sectors included in the analysis are 99, corresponding to the 
Harmonised System nomenclature (two-digit codes) employed by Eurostat.  
Not very surprisingly, Ukraine's comparative advantages are concentrated in just a few sectors 
(Table 2): raw materials, agricultural products, iron and steel and some transport equipment 
(locomotives). Among them, only cereals constitute more than 10 per cent of total EU imports 
in that category. Therefore full liberalisation of imports from Ukraine, also in sectors deemed 
sensitive (agricultural products, textiles and steel) could be very beneficial to it, because it 
could better exploit its pattern of comparative advantage, without being a major threat for 
specific sectors of the EU economy. 
<insert Table 2 here> 
Among EU member states, Italy is the main importer from Ukraine (23 per cent of total EU 
imports), followed by Germany and Poland, whilst Germany is the major exporter (it makes 
28 per cent of total EU exports to Ukraine), followed by Poland and Italy (Table 3). Both 
economic dimension and geographical proximity clearly determine the positions in Table 3. 
Germany, Italy and Poland are large countries located quite close to Ukraine (Poland is also 
the member state sharing the longest border with it). Smaller countries like Hungary and the 
Czech Republic exploit their proximity to Ukraine and precede larger but remote countries, 
such as the United Kingdom (UK) or Spain. 
<insert Table 3 here> 
Potential benefits, even if quite limited, from trade liberalisation seem thus to accrue mainly 
to the CEECs, Italy and Germany. Possible costs could arise if some EU members' exports 
had to face a strong risk of competition from Ukraine. We can be more precise and assess 
potential competition on the EU market between Ukraine and EU countries by means of a   11 
similarity index proposed by Finger and Kreinin (1979), which compares the export structures 
of two countries or regions:      
                 
S = Si min[Xi,k/Xi);(XUKR,k/XUKR)]                                                         (2) 
 
where  
Xi,k and XUKR,k are respectively the values of EU country i’s and Ukraine’s exports of sector k 
to the EU; 
Xi and XUKR are respectively the values of EU country i’s and Ukraine’s total exports to the 
EU. 
The index takes a value between 0 and 1; the higher its value, the more similar the export 
structures of EU country  i and Ukraine. In other words, if the index is close to 0, the two 
countries’ exports are highly complementary, whereas, if it approaches 1, a strong potential 
competition exists between the two countries on the export markets. The figures in Table 4 
show that the value of the index is lower than 0.4 for all member states (Austria has the 
highest one, which barely reaches 0.35); therefore, at present no serious threat from trade 
integration with Ukraine exists for any EU country's economy. 
<insert Table 4 here> 
To summarise this section's findings, EU-Ukraine trade relations are marked by a strongly 
asymmetrical interdependence: Ukraine's economy could get large benefits from the creation 
of an FTA, whereas benefits for the EU would be small and concentrated in a few countries 
(the CEECs, Italy and Germany). Potential costs for the EU, in terms of  more competitive 
pressures for specific sectors or countries, would not be significant. Hence trade liberalisation 
is an issue of low political salience for the EU: it should not face a strong opposition from any 
member state and might represent a realistic medium-term objective.3 
 
4.2  ENP 
 
While an FTA may be a medium-term goal, the second scenario we outline is to be 
considered as a long-term prospect. It can be briefly defined as "FTA plus the other three 
freedoms of movement (services, capital and persons)" and corresponds to a full exploitation 
of the opportunities provided by the ENP. It would entail a degree of participation in the 
Single Market (and therefore of economic integration) comparable to the present EEA.4 
The benefits from liberalisation of trade in services are widely recognised: greater   12 
competition can lead to efficiency gains in both the services sector itself and the other sectors 
of the economy relying on services as an input. Moreover, when liberalisation involves areas 
with different levels of economic development, technology transfer from the most advanced 
countries to the least advanced ones (for instance, via foreign direct investment) can be a 
significant source of additional growth for the latter (Mattoo et al. 2001). Services 
liberalisation necessarily require a process of regulatory harmonisation. The rationale for it is 
to overcome the effects of non-tariff barriers to trade such as standards and regulations 
imposed for environmental, health, safety or consumer protection reasons, which have 
become more and more relevant in determining actual market access (Brenton and Manchin 
2003).  
The very close link between trade in services and foreign direct investment (FDI) raises the 
issue of free movement of capital. Liberalisation in this field could bring large efficiency 
gains to Ukraine's economy, which is highly dependent on the EU as a source of FDI. Indeed 
data from Eurostat and the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine indicate a very strong 
asymmetrical interdependence: in 2003, 56 per cent of Ukraine's inward FDI stock came from 
the EU-25, representing, however, only a tiny share (0.05 per cent) of EU-25 total stock of 
outward FDI.   
In order to actually reap the potential benefits from freedom of movement of services and 
capital, Ukraine would have to make considerable effort in implementing politically sensitive 
reforms. Regulatory harmonisation in the context of the ENP would simply mean that Ukraine 
should adopt EU standards. Capital liberalisation would be productive only if accompanied by 
sound economic policies, at both the macroeconomic and the microeconomic level, including 
fiscal and monetary discipline and a proper regulatory environment (European Commission 
2005a).  
A detailed analysis of the problems currently faced by Ukraine's economic system is far 
beyond the scope of this paper. We just mention that, contrary to what has happened to the 
CEECs, the process towards the creation of a functioning market economy has so far been 
very slow and largely unsuccessful: the political economy of transition in Ukraine has been 
marked by plenty of opportunities for rent-seeking, promptly exploited by the so-called 
'oligarchs', a small number of people who gained and still retain the control of most of the 
manufacturing and services sectors (Pynzenyk 2000, Sundakov 2000, Sellar and Pickles 2002, 
Åslund 2005, Kuzio 2005). Taming oligarchs' power is therefore the most challenging task for 
a reform-minded government eager to achieve a high degree of integration with the EU. 
Finally, the most sensitive issue for EU public opinion certainly concerns the free movement   13 
of people. The distribution of immigrants from Ukraine in the EU is reported in Table 5.5 The 
largest number of Ukrainian citizens reside in Germany (116,000), where, however, they only 
represent 1.6 per cent of total foreign population. In the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia 
(three countries located near Ukraine), the Ukrainians constitute quite a large share of 
immigrants (from 25 per cent to 16 per cent of total).  
<insert Table 5 here> 
Some opposition to free movement of Ukrainian nationals may thus be expected to come 
especially from neighbouring countries, even if, among EU member states, they would be 
those reaping the largest benefits from economic integration with  Ukraine. Their position 
mirrors the situation faced by Austria and Germany with regard to the 2004 enlargement 
(Boeri and Brucker 2002). The temporary restrictions to freedom of movement for CEEC 
nationals, even after their countries' accession to the EU,  imposed by most "old" member 
states may constitute a precedent for similar or more stringent measures applicable to 
Ukraine, with a view to reassuring internal public opinion. 
On the whole the long-term nature of the ENP prospects represents an example of uncertainty 
about the future effects of specific policies. Given the economic disparities and the 
differences in regulatory environment between the EU and Ukraine, liberalisation of trade in 
services and of capital and labour movement could only be achieved very gradually. This 
might help overcome opposition within the EU, especially with regard to the free movement 
of people, but at the same time it would reduce the incentives for radical economic and 
political reform in Ukraine. 
 
4.3  EU accession 
 
Ukraine has not been granted the prospect of EU membership so far; therefore any scenario 
contemplating EU accession is not only long-term, but also very hypothetical.  EU 
membership implies a higher degree of economic integration than the previous scenarios and 
introduces new significant elements of political integration. We define it in a stylised way as 
"ENP plus Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and structural policies plus participation in 
EU institutions". 
In the economic field, the EU budget should be modified to include CAP payments and 
Structural Funds attributed to Ukraine. The historical precedent of the 2004 enlargement 
suggests two reflections. Firstly, some opposition could come from two groups of countries: 
net contributors to the budget (such as Germany and the Netherlands), which should pay the   14 
largest share of the cost of Ukraine's accession, and the present poorest member states (the 
CEECs) fearing to lose part of the Structural Funds. Secondly, the actual cost of enlargement 
to Ukraine could be accommodated without any disruptive impact on the budget. To support 
the latter claim, one can make a simple illustrative calculation, whose methodology is 
described in detail in the Annex. The maximum net cost of a hypothetical enlargement to 
Ukraine in 2005 could reach €2.46 billion, corresponding to only 0.025 per cent of EU-25 
GDP. Moreover, the EU could easily exploit its superior bargaining power and the 
asymmetrical interdependence in its relations with Ukraine in order to i mpose transition 
periods or t emporary restrictions that Ukraine would be almost obliged to accept without 
modifications.  
In the political field, Ukraine's participation in the EU institutions would exert some impact 
especially on the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. With 48 million people, 
this country would account for roughly 10 per cent of the EU population and would get a 
number of votes and seats similar to that of France, Italy and the UK, becoming a significant 
player in EU decision-making processes. The main p olitical issue raised by Ukraine's 
accession would concern however the completion of its process of  stabilisation and 
democratisation: according to the Copenhagen Criteria, Ukraine should guarantee 'democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities' (European Council 
1993)  to be considered for EU membership. The successful creation of a fully-fledged 
democracy would clearly bring large geopolitical benefits to the EU, especially to Ukraine's 
neighbouring countries. This was already evident during the 2004 Orange Revolution, when 
Poland and Lithuania acted as "drivers" in spurring the EU to support it, whilst France and 
Germany were more reluctant to intervene because they feared to worsen their relations with 
Russia (Emerson et al. 2005, Nemyria 2005). 
Nevertheless, Ukraine has not been recognised as a potential candidate for membership yet. 
What could determine a change in its status? The answer may well depend on the fate of EU 
relations with Turkey, another large and poor country at the borders of Europe which, unlike 
Ukraine, has been granted the prospect of EU membership and started negotiations in October 
2005, even if their outcome is still open-ended and might fall short of accession (European 
Commission 2005e).  
At present, Ukraine can be compared to Turkey also with regard to its degree of economic and 
political freedom. To do so, we choose two frequently used indicators: the Index of Economic 
Freedom by the Heritage Foundation (Heritage Foundation 2005) and the Freedom in the 
World Index by the Freedom House (Freedom House 2005). The former ranks countries'   15 
economies on a scale from 1 (completely free) to 5 (completely repressed). Over the last few 
years, the gap between Turkey and Ukraine has progressively shrunk and in 2004 Ukraine 
scored better than Turkey for the first time (3.21 against 3.46). Nevertheless, both are still 
classified as 'mostly unfree' economies (Figure 4). According to the latter, the score attributed 
to a country's political system may range between 1 (completely free) and 7 (completely 
repressed). Ukraine's ranking was better than Turkey's until 2001, but worse afterwards. 
Throughout the last decade its score always ranged between 4 and 3.5, whilst that of Turkey 
improved from 5 to 3; however, both countries remain only 'partly free' (Figure 5).6 
<insert Figure 4 here> 
<insert Figure 5 here> 
Table 6 summarises the six possible outcomes of the "accession game" involving Ukraine and 
Turkey. If the quality of political and economic reform in Ukraine is worse than that in 
Turkey (or similar to it, but Turkey is not admitted in the EU), then for Ukraine the doors of 
the EU will be closed, because it is very unlikely that the criteria applied to Turkey may be 
made more flexible for Ukraine (cases 2, 5 and 6). If Turkey enters the EU and Ukraine 
performs as well as or better than it with respect to the accession criteria, then Ukraine too 
may become a member, since a rejection of its application would appear as an unfair decision 
(cases 1 and 3); rhetorical action may play a role, in particular by demanding the respect of 
the principle of equal treatment between similar candidates.  
The most controversial situation arises if Turkey does not join the EU, but Ukraine 
outperforms Turkey in terms of political and economic achievements (case 4). In such a case, 
the outcome is a priori indeterminate: on the one hand, Ukraine may fulfil the requirements 
for EU membership, but, on the other, member states may manifest the will to block any 
enlargement involving a large and poor country. Here there is wide room for rhetorical action 
to be played by both Ukraine and those member states, like Poland and the other CEECs, 
expecting to obtain the largest geopolitical payoff from Ukraine's accession. Strategies such 
as emphasising Ukraine's European identity and underlining its satisfactory performance with 
regard to the accession criteria may help to strengthen the bargaining power of the actors in 
favour of opening the EU's door to that country. 
<insert Table 6 here> 
 
4.4  A comparison 
 
A comparison of the three scenarios permits to examine their efficiency, as defined in Section   16 
3. An FTA is a medium-term objective which does not need deep reforms in Ukraine to be 
achieved; hence it cannot be considered as efficient. On the contrary, a fully developed ENP 
does require a long-term process of thorough economic and political reform, but, 
unfortunately, does not provide Ukraine with enough incentive to realize it. Indeed, Ukraine 
would have to adopt the acquis communautaire concerning the Single Market without reaping 
the benefits of EU membership, such as the CAP, the Structural Funds and participation in the 
EU decision-making process. In their absence, it would be unlikely that the Ukrainian 
government might build a broad consensus in public opinion for difficult reforms facing 
strong opposition from the powerful domestic groups controlling most of the economy. 
Therefore, only the prospect of EU membership can act as an effective external anchor for 
radical political and economic reform. 
It follows that EU membership is the only efficient scenario: the ENP cannot be a credible 
alternative to it for Ukraine in the long run. Actually the EEA, the model of economic 
integration to which a fully developed ENP would tend, aims to provide a strong link to the 
EU for some Western European countries which do not want to join it (at present, Norway, 
Iceland and Liechtenstein), but is not intended as a substitute for membership for countries 
that, by contrast, wish to enter the EU. Hence a fully developed ENP is a very unlikely 
scenario; as a consequence, the long-term outcome of the integration process will probably be 
either more modest (remaining essentially limited to the creation of an FTA) or more 
ambitious, leading therefore to EU accession. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
This article has proposed a liberal intergovernmentalist framework for the analysis of 
Ukraine's prospects of integration with the EU with a view to evaluating the main benefits and 
costs associated to three possible scenarios: FTA, fully developed ENP and EU accession. Its 
main findings can be briefly summarised as follows. First, gains from integration would be 
asymmetrically distributed and would mostly accrue to Ukraine, while the main obstacles 
would come from political rather than economic reasons. Second, the ENP does not represent 
a credible long-term alternative to EU membership for Ukraine; thus the likely outcome of the 
integration process should consist either in the mere creation of a free trade area or in EU 
accession. 
Finally, a relevant issue not discussed in this article concerns the possible influence of   17 
relations with Russia on Ukraine's integration with the EU. However, the trade-off between 
integration with the EU and integration with Russia may well turn out to be more apparent 
than real. Ukraine's rapprochement with the EU does not exclude the maintenance of close 
economic ties with Russia as long as integration between the EU and Russia proceeds too. In 
this latter field, a significant step forward was achieved in May 2005 with the agreement on a 
road map aiming to build Common Spaces in four areas: economy; freedom, security and 
justice; external security; research education and culture (European Commission 2005b). 
Moreover, Russia's cooperation might also be beneficial to EU-Ukraine relations themselves 
and even help Ukraine to avoid "knocking on the EU's door" indefinitely.  
 
 
Annex. The cost of Ukraine's membership  
 
In estimating the cost of Ukraine's membership for the EU budget, we a pply a simple 
methodology similar to that used by Gros (2005) in the case of Turkey. The approach consists 
in calculating the net benefits from the EU budget that Ukraine would receive under current 
rules if today it were a EU member. At first sight, this might seem somewhat unrealistic, but it 
avoids the problem of making necessarily arbitrary assumptions about Ukraine's possible 
accession date, the evolution of EU budgetary rules, and future economic growth rates of both 
the EU and Ukraine. Taking into account that the goal of this exercise is merely to indicate 
the possible order of magnitude of the cost of Ukraine's membership, simplicity and 
transparency may be preferred to more sophisticated methods.  
The two fundamental items of the EU budget are the CAP and the Structural Funds.  The 
calculations for agriculture are potentially quite complex, since we should consider the output 
structure of agriculture in Ukraine. However, we can avoid that by using an indirect approach, 
based on the ratio between CAP support and agricultural production. At present, the CAP 
absorbs 0.5 per cent of EU-25 GDP and the value added produced by agriculture is about 2.5 
per cent of EU-25 GDP. Therefore we may assume that European farmers get at most 20 per 
cent of their value added from the CAP. To simplify the calculations further, suppose that 
Ukraine is treated exactly like one of the old EU-15 members and is not subject to the 
temporary restrictions applied to the new members. Finally, agriculture produces 14 per cent 
of Ukraine's GDP and the U krainian economy accounts for 0.45 per cent of EU-25 GDP. 
Consequently, the maximum amount of CAP support to Ukraine would be 0.013 per cent 
(=20%*14%*0.45%) of EU-25 GDP.     18 
As regards the Structural Funds, the calculation is straightforward. Under existing rules, the 
amount of Structural Funds that a country may receive is capped at 4 per cent of its national 
GDP and, as before, the Ukrainian economy accounts for 0.45 per cent of EU-25 GDP. 
Therefore, Ukraine would get 0.018 per cent (=4%*0.45%) of EU-25 GDP at most. 
Since the EU budget approximately equals 1.2 per cent of EU-25 GDP, this implies that 
Ukraine's contributions to it would amount to about 1.2 per cent of its GDP, which, as above, 
corresponds to 0.45 per cent of that of the EU-25. Therefore Ukraine's contributions to the EU 
budget would represent 0.0054 per cent (=1.2%*0.45%) of EU-25 GDP. After subtracting 
contributions from total receipts, Ukraine's maximum total net receipts from the EU budget 
would then reach 0.025 per cent of EU-25 GDP. The main findings of these calculations are 
summarised in Table A.1. Since EU-25 total GDP presently amounts to €10,270 billion, the 
annual net cost of Ukraine's membership would be €2.46 billion. 
<insert Table A.1 here> 
 
Notes 
1. The geographical coverage of the ENP includes some former Soviet republics (Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia and Moldova) and countries in the Mediterranean region (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia). 
2. This  remark follows from the logic of two-level games, firstly proposed by Putnam (1988). Using his 
terminology, the requirement of unanimity among its member states greatly restricts the EU's range of acceptable 
outcomes (its "win-set") when it negotiates with a third country, implying that the final agreement will tend to be 
quite close to the EU's position. 
3. However, as mentioned in Section 2, the necessary precondition for the opening of negotiations for an FTA is 
Ukraine's accession to the World Trade Organization. 
4. Here we abstract from the institutional provisions governing the EEA. For more details on this subject, see 
Vahl (2005). 
5. Data were not available for all EU member states. 
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Table 1. EU trade with Ukraine by main sectors in 2004 (€ million) 
  EU Imports  EU Exports  Balance 
Machinery  341  3139  +2798 
Chemicals  489  1565  +1075 
Transport equipment  247  1265  +1018 
Textiles and clothing  492  764  +272 
Agricultural products  855  680  -175 
Energy  1001  102  -898 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Table 2. Ukraine's largest RCA in trade with the EU (2004) 
Sectors  RCA Index  % of total EU  imports 
Ores, slag and ash    17.21  4.32% 
Cereals    13.83  11.28% 
Railway or tramway locomotives  9.76  9.75% 
Iron and steel    8.03  6.28% 
Salt; sulphur; earths and stone   7.64  4.03% 
Raw hides and skins; leather    6.60  4.12% 
Animal or vegetable fats, oils and waxes    6.59  4.23% 
Albuminoidal substances   5.16  5.81% 
Wood and articles of wood  4.09  2.56% 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits   3.88  1.47% 
Source: author's calculations based on Eurostat data   24 
 
Table 3. EU trade with Ukraine by main partner countries (2004) 
EU IMPORTS  EU EXPORTS 
Country  Share of EU imports 
from Ukraine  Country  Share of EU exports to 
Ukraine 
Italy    23.38%  Germany   28.49% 
Germany   12.57%  Poland    15.87% 
Poland    11.78%  Italy    10.54% 
Hungary    7.55%  France    5.58% 
Czech Republic  6.09%  Netherlands    5.20% 
Spain    5.32%  Hungary    4.79% 
Slovakia    4.50%  Austria    3.67% 
Austria    4.24%  Czech Republic   3.58% 
France    4.03%  Belgium   3.49% 
Netherlands    3.50%  UK    3.03% 




Table 4. Similarity of export structure between Ukraine and EU member States (first  
ten rankings, 2004) 
Country  Similarity Index 
Austria  0.352 
Germany  0.345 
UK  0.338 
Latvia  0.317 
Slovakia  0.310 
Lithuania  0.307 
Sweden  0.304 
Belgium  0.291 
Poland  0.271 
Hungary  0.270 
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Share of total foreign 
population 
Czech 
Republic  59.1  25.5% 
Poland  9.9  20.1% 
Slovakia  4.7  15.9% 
Portugal  62.0  15.0% 
Hungary  9.9  8.5% 
Lithuania  1.6  7.7% 
Greece  13.6  1.8% 
Germany  116.0  1.6% 
Netherlands  2.2  0.3% 
Source: OECD (2005) 
 
Table 6. The Ukraine-Turkey accession game 
  Turkey enters the 
EU 
Turkey does not enter 
the EU 
Ukraine performs as 
well as Turkey 
IN                     (1)  OUT                           (2) 
Ukraine performs 
better than Turkey 
IN                     (3)  ?                                 (4) 
Ukraine performs 
worse than Turkey 
OUT                 (5)  OUT                           (6) 
IN = Ukraine can enter the EU 
OUT = Ukraine cannot enter the EU 
? = Uncertainty 
 
 
Table A.1. The cost of Ukraine's membership of the EU (in % of EU-25 GDP) 
CAP  0.0126% 
Structural Funds  0.0179% 
Total Receipts  0.0305% 
Total Contributions  -0.0054% 
TOTAL NET RECEIPTS  0.0251% 
Source: author's calculations 
 